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Notes
CIVIL LAW PROPERTY-THE LAW OF TREASURE AND LOST THINGS
Upon the death of the decedent her heirs were placed in pos-
session of her estate. In disposing of the estate the heirs,sid
decedent's mattress to the vendee-claimants for two dollars, and
fifty cents. The mattress was delivered to a mattress factory
for renovation. In the process of renovation the cotton contents,
when subjected to a blast of air, yielded several thousand dollars
in gold certificates. The mattress company made no claim, for
the certificates. The United States brought an interpleader, 1
claiming the certificates but agreeing to pay the rightful owner
their face value. The vendees claimed ownership of the certifi-
cates by virtue of Article 34232 of the Louisiana Civil Code, con-
tending that the certificates were treasure and that therefore
ownership vested in them as finders. 3 The heirs, in asserting
their right to the certificates, relied on Article 3422, 4 contending
that the certificates were lost property and as such should be
returned to them. The United States District Court held that
the heirs would be entitled to the certificates under either Article
3422 or 3423. United States v. Peter, 178 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. L4.
1959).
Treasure and lost property are considered in the Louisiana
Civil Code under the topic of occupancy. 5 The Code provides
that the finder of lost property, having advertised the finding,
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 (1958).
2. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3423 (1870): "Although a treasure be not of:. the
number of the things which are lost or abandoned, or which never belonged to
anybody, yet: he who finds it on his own land, or on land belonging to nobody,
acquires the entire ownership of it; and should such treasure be found on the labd
of another, one-half of it shall belong to the finder and the other half to the owner
of the soil.
"A treasure is a thing hidden or buried in the earth, on which no.one can
prove his property, and which is discovered by chance."
3. The vendees originally contended that when they purchased the mattress;
ownership of the gold certificates contained therein was transferred to. them.
They abandoned this contention when it appeared that it was without merit, as
it was unlawful to acquire gold certificates after 1933. A transfer which is pro-
hibited by law is void. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 12, 1764, 1779, 1885, 1891, .1892,
1893 (1870). See also 31 C.F.R. 53.1 (1934).
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3422 (1870): "If he, who has found a movable"thii
that was. lost, having caused it to be published in newspapers, and having on e
all that was possible to find out the true owner, can not learn who he is, he
remains master of it till he, who was the proper owner, appears and proves' his
right; but if it be not claimed within ten years, the thing becomes his property,
and he may dispose of it at his will."
5. See id. arts. 3412, 3413, 3414.
[739].
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shall become the owner after the passage of ten years, by virtue
of a presumption that the property has been abandoned. It is
then considered as res nullius, a thing with no owner, and the
finder who possesses as owner becomes master of it.6 The neces-
sity of waiting ten years may be avoided if the finder can prove
abandonment. Abandonment is a matter not easily proven;7
however, if the burden of proof can be satisfied, the property is
considered as not having an owner, and ownership will vest
immediately in the finder.8  The jurisprudence lends little to
the interpretation of Article 3422 since the cases have not dealt
with the presumption of abandonment after passage of ten
years, but only with proof of actual abandonment. 9 Also the
'French Code and writers are of little assistance, since the French
.do not have an article comparable to Article 3422.10
It appears that the only statement of law in Louisiana per-
taining to the subject of treasure is found in Article 3423 which
provides that the finder of treasure acquires ownership im-
mediately upon the finding.1 ' While there are no reported cases
interpreting Article 3423, the article indicates that there are
6. Donnell v. Gray, 215 La. 497, 41 So.2d 66 (1949); Standard Oil Co. v.
Kinnebrew, 155 La. 1009, 99 So. 802 (1924) ; J. A. Bel Lumber Co. v. Stout,
134 La. 987, 64 So. 881 (1914) ; Powell v. Cox, 92 So.2d 739 (La. App. 1957).
7. See Donnell v. Gray, 215 La. 497, 41 So.2d 66 (1949) ; The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term, 10 LoUISIANA LAW REVIEW
120, 178 (1950).8: LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3421 (1870) : "He who finds a thing which is aban-
'doned; that is, which its owner has left with the intention not to keep it any
longer, becomes master of it in the same manner as if it had never belonged to
ant body."
9. Donnell v. Gray, 215 La. 497, 41 So.2d 66 (1949) ; Standard Oil Co. v.
Kinnebrew, 155 La. 1009, 99 So. 802 (1924); J. A. Bel Lumber Co. v. Stout,
134 La. 987, 64 So. 881 (1914) ; Pirtle v. Price, 31 La. Ann. 357 (1879) ; East-
man ,. Harris, 4 La. Ann. 193 (1849) ; Powell v. Cox, 92 So.2d 739 (La. App.
1957). See Note, 5 LOYOLA L. REV. 83 (1949).
10. Article 717 of the Code Civil provides that lost property will be governed
by "special laws"; however, no subsequent legislation has been enacted to provide
such .laws. Article 2279 of the Code Civil, which provides that possession is
equivalent to title, specifically excludes from the operation of this article prop-
erty- which is either lost or stolen. As to these, it provides that the owner may
recllaim his property within three years from the date the property was found.
Planiol deems the finding of lost property to be a mode of acquisition analogous
to occupancy, for lost property is as if it were without a master, although this
is not technically correct since the master merely has been unable to locate his
property.* In such case the French provide that ownership will spring from
.acquisitive prescription of three years, rather than at the moment of taking pos-
session as in the case of true occupancy. See I PLANIOL & RIPERT, TREATISE ON
ITHE. CIvIL LAw (translation by the Louisiana State Law Institute) nos. 2583-2586
(.1959J). Thus it can be seen little help is available from the French on the
proper interpretation of Article 3422.
11. By' virtue of LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3423 (1870), treasure is deemed to be
property belonging to no one. One who possesses such property, with the inten-
tioa of possessing as owner, becomes the owner of the property. Donnell v. Gray,
215 La. 497, 41 So.2d 66 (1949) (dictum).
NOTES
three requirements to be met before property can be considered
"treasure": (1) that the property be hidden or buried in the
earth, (2) that no one can prove his ownership to the property,
and (3) that such property be found by chance. Since Article
3423 is essentially the same as Article 71612 in the French Civil
Code,. some assistance may be gained in interpreting Article 3423
by looking to the French. Planiol suggests that the French code
definition be interpreted to add the requirement that the treasure
be movable.1 3 This requirement was incorporated into Article
3423 thereby eliminating the possibility of considering natural
resources as treasure. Planiol also suggests that the general
rule that treasure is normally hidden or buried in the earth is
not to be taken in a restrictive sense, but rather that property
found concealed within other movables be also classified as
treasure.1
4
In the instant case the court stated that it was not necessary
to distinguish the situations intended to be encompassed by the
lost property article15 and the treasure article. 1 In either case
the initial determination to be made is whether anyone can prove
his ownership of the property. In the instant case the heirs were
able to prove to the court's satisfaction that the property be-
longed to the decedent. It would follow that the heirs could
recover under Article 3423, the treasure article, since the cer-
tificates could no longer be classified as property to which no
one could prove ownership. Although the court's disposition of
the instant case seems correct, it leaves in doubt the interpreta-
tion of other requirements of Article 3423.' Since the court
found that the certificates belonged to the decedent, and could
be claimed by the heirs, it was not necessary to consider the
requirement that treasure be hidden or buried in the earth.
12. CODE CIVIL art. 716: "Treasure trove belongs to the finder when he finds it
on his property. If it is found on another person's property it belongs half to the
finder and the other half to the owner of the property. Treasure trove is every-
thing hidden or buried in the earth which no one can prove belongs to him and
which is discovered by mere chance." (Wright's transl. 1908).
13. See 1 PLANIOL AND RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW (translation by
the Louisiana State Law Institute) no. 2578 (1959).
14. See id, nos. 2578-2580. Planiol would also deem the requirement of find-
ing by chance to be a useless condition. This contention finds support in the
Roman law, since this requirement would seem applicable only to trespassers in
the Roman law. CODE 10.15.1; BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW
144 (1928) ; Note, 15 B.U.L. REv. 656 (1935).
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3422 (1870).
16. Id. art. 3423. See United States v. Peter, 178 F. Supp. 854, 856 (E.D.
La. 1959).
17. A strict interpretation of the article would require not only that the prop-
:erty belong to no one but that it be hidden or buried in the ground and found by
chance.
1960]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
Whether the Louisiana courts will follow the solution suggested
by Planiol' s remains a subject of speculation. Further support-
ing its decision not to distinguish between the two articles, the
court added in a footnote: "Articles 3422 and 3423 merely show
that Louisiana has followed the trend toward merging the law
of treasure trove with the law of lost property."'' 9 In referring to
the merging of the law of treasure and lost property, the court
was apparently referring to the trend toward such a merger in
Anglo-American jurisdictions. The Anglo-American case law
dealing with found property seems primarily concerned with a
determination of whether the property is to be counted as lost
of treasure trove with the law of lost property."1 In referring to
determination, the courts have stated that the finder will retain
the property against all but the true owner.2 1 This is often con-
strued as meaning that the law of treasure and the law of lost
property have merged, 22 the rights of the finder in either case
being identical. However, the Anglo-American trend toward
merger is in relation to the rights of the actual finder and not,
as in the instant case, one who purchases the object in which
the treasure is contained. 23 In relation to the Louisiana law it
would seem incorrect to consider Articles 3422 and 3423 as fol-
lowing the trend toward merger, since they are two distinct
18.: See 1 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW (Translation by
the Louisiana, State Law Institute) no. 2578 (1959).
19. United States v. Peter, 178 F. Supp. 854, 856n. (E.D. La. 1959).
20. See Danielson v. Roberts, 44 Ore. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904); Groover v.
Tippins, 51 Ga.App. 47, 179 S.E. 634 (1935) ; Vickery v. Hardin, 77 Ind. App.
588, 133 N.E. 922 (1922) ; 34 Am. JUR. Lost Property § 4 (1941) ; 36 C.J.S.
Finding Lost Goods § 1 (1943). See also Annot., 170 A.L.R. 707 (1947), where
the cases place property which has been found into three classifications: (1) It
is considered to be treasure when the property is gold or silver in coin, plate,
bullion or paper representations thereof which have been intentionally concealed
by a former owner who is now deceased. (2) It is considered as lost when the
possession has been casually and involuntarily parted with through negligence or
carelessness. (3) It is considered as mislaid when intentionally put in a place by
the owner and then forgotten for a time. But see Schley v. Couch, 155 Tex. 195,
284 S.W.2d 333 (1955), in which the Texas court rejects any classification of
property as treasure. The Texas solution would classify all such property as
either lost or mislaid. The determining factor in each case would be the length of
time which the property has been concealed.
21. See note 20 supra.
22. Weeks v. Hackett, 104 Me. 264, 265, 71 Atl. 858 (1908); Roberson v.
Ellis, 58 Ore. 219, 114 Pac. 100 (1911); BROWN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
PERSONAL PROPERTY 25 (1936) ; Aigler, Rights of Finders, 21 Micn. L. REV.
664 (1922) ; Riesman, Possession and the Law of Finders, 52 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1112 (1939) ; Comment, 8 FoRD. L. REv. 222 (1939) ; Notes, 6 MINN. L.
REV. 527 (1922), 22 TEMP. L.Q. 326, 328 (1949).
23. See Note, 23 TUL. L. REV. 409, 410 (1949) : "American courts have con-
sistently held that the finder of treasure has better title than the owner of the
locus in quo." Vickery v. Hardin, 77 Ind. App. 588, 133 N.E. 922 (1922);
Roberson v. Ellis, 58 Ore. 219, 114 Pac. 100 (1911) ; Danielson v. Roberts, 44
Ore. 108, 74 Pac. 913 (1904).
NOTES
articles, each applicable in different factual situations. If the
conditions set forth in Article 3423 are met, the property can
properly be considered treasure and ownership will vest in the
finder at the moment of his finding. Article 3422 provides the
general rule and operates to preserve the right of the owner to
reclaim his property within ten years. This article will be ap-
plicable unless the property specifically fits the requirements of
other articles, which operate to vest ownership in the finder
immediately. 24 Any general conclusion to the effect that Lou-
isiana has followed the Anglo-American trend toward merger
would seem improper since the Code operates to vest the finder
with ownership immediately in the one case and not until the
passage of ten years in the other. However, all that was neces-
sary for the disposition of the instant case was the determina-
tion that the heirs had shown satisfactory proof of the owner-
ship by the decedent and therefore were entitled to recover the
certificates. Thus the case does not shed much light on the
future interpretation of the code provision pertaining to treasure
in Louisiana.
Gerald L. Walter, Jr.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - SELF-INCRIMINATION - DISBARMENT OF
ATTORNEY FOR PLEADING STATE PRIVILEGE IN A
JUDICIAL INQUIRY
A New York attorney was called before a judicial inquiry
being held for the purpose of investigating unethical practices in
the procurement and prosecution of negligence cases handled on
a contingent fee basis. The attorney invoked the state privilege
against self-incrimination,' refusing to testify or to produce his
records on negligence cases for which he had filed retainers. It
was not disputed that the assertion of the privilege was in good
faith, or that the information sought to be elicited was relevant
to the purpose of the inquiry. In an original disbarment pro-
24. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3420 (1870) (dealing with precious stones) ; id. art.
3421 (dealing with abandoned property); id. art. 3423 (dealing with treasure).
1. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 (1938) provides: ". . . nor shall he be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself .. " The NEw YORK CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 83 (1914) provides: "A competent witness shall not be excused
from answering a relevant question, on the ground only that the answer may tend
to establish the fact, that he owes a debt, or is otherwise subject to a civil suit.
But this provision does not require a witness to give an answer, which will tend
to accuse himself of a crime or misdemeanor or to expose him to a penalty or
forfeiture; nor does it vary any other rule, respecting the examination of a
witness."
19601
